The Global Institutional Order and the Problem of Resource Curse

Frank Aragbonfoh Abumere .


This paper is aimed at analysing the role of the global institutional order in resource curse. To achieve this aim, the author discussed the complexity of resource curse and the multifaceted nature of the activities that cause resource curse. Despite the complexity of resource curse and the multifaceted nature of the activities that cause resource curse, the particular role of the global institutional order is identified, among different causal roles played by different agents, and thus attributed causal responsibility to the global institutional order.  This attribution of causal responsibility is based on the implicit argument, which pervades this paper, that any actor or agent that contributes to causing resource curse is responsible on the ‘level’, and to the extent, the actor or agent contributes to causing resource curse.


Global Institutional Order, International Borrowing Privilege, International Resource Privilege, Property Right, Resource Curse.

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